Choosing between PLG (Product-led Growth), SLG (Sales-led Growth) and CLG (Customer-led growth) is a question of structurization of commercial effort. Or where the greatest effort is concentrated: downstream — like in Sales, upstream — in Product or midstream — with Customers engagement. Let’s discuss PLG, SLG and CLG in the perspective of the Go-To-Market stage by focusing on the central question of the GTM stage and the criteria of the solution — choosing the right GTM motion.
The core question of Go-To-Market stage is how to externalise the GTM cost to the customer at the acceptable economy level.
This “waste dilemma” makes the core criterion of selection of the GTM motion. The waste dilemma says:
"Each GTM motion creates a waste and the waste patterns are archetypized on the level of PLG, SLG and CLG strategies."
“To succumb to the inherent waste of the growth strategy is to unlock the growth as such. But to accumulate waste means to eventually break the growth economy and die from accumulation of surviving.”
PLG (Product-led Growth) is a strategy that focuses on developing strong proposition clarity that further saves the organization’s time and resources on negotiations, including:
PLG says:
“If you have this problem and pertain to the customer cohort we love, — please see the outcome of using our product for your business. If you like it, you can choose your plan of pricing, but can’t largely change conditions thereof.”
SLG (Sales-led Growth) does not aim at saving resources in negotiation foremost. Instead, SLG focuses on regrouping of efforts — from early customer qualification through product proposition to the postponed qualification that still takes place via sales scripts, etc.
Overall, SLG shifts an activity focus to the final stages of customer journey where — presumably — belongs the greatest value for money. Sales teams are costly as compared to the landing pages and customer journeys funnels (the PLG inventory) but they bring in the flexibility and the greater precision in negotiations. Their battleground is complex products, where multiple stakeholders might be involved. By their definition and the economic considerations they belong to B2B and high value deals.
SLG says:
“If you belong to this market, then you may need our product, — please schedule a meeting so we can explain how your business may benefit the most from it. It is a sales call disguised as education.”
CLG (Customer-led growth) as a strategy stands one step closer to the customer as compared to PLG and SLG. Customer-led growth uses customer insights and relations to drive growth. Here two questions emerge:
CLG eludes the direct, “face to face” comparison with PLG and SLG on the way it structures the customer negotiations — the Growth economy question — because it starts when the (first) customer is already won. But in principle it has an answer to this: Customer becomes a co-creator of the product value proposition, for example, through:
This strategy is distinct from the other two in the level of details too. It is not a set of prescriptions or rules — rather a philosophy. But, in the end, is it the same growth that all three strategies mind? I think not. If a growth is defined as attracting more customers to an existing product [value proposition], then CLG minds also the other type of growth — revenue growth. A typical CLG pipeline looks like this:
Onboard -> Partner -> Delight, which means that CLG also aims at further structurization of product and extraction of more value from those customers who benefit it the most. So, it aims — in principle — at more fair cost and benefits distribution between customer and organization.
This provides the solution to the second problem above or Why can’t PLG and SLG incorporate the Customer-led methodology? Because, with CLG Customer need or “Voice of the Customer” is a pillar of all cost-benefits negotiations.
CLG says:
“If you help us understand what your real problem is and how we can solve it better, — we will tailor the proposition for you specifically, that is stripped from what’s not necessary for you. So, we unbundle the proposition offer on a “per-customer” scenario.”
It’s not directly so in practice, because the product or marketing teams still tend to segment / archetypize customer-sourced problems and solutions, but the general idea holds true.
The solution to the question of how to choose PLG vs SLG vs CLG might be rephrased as How to optimally structure commercial efforts in my organization and it lies in the phenomenon of Growth Economy or how to organize the “Give and Take” relations with clients to fuel enterprise growth.
This economy is a what you propose as an outcome of negotiations with clients‚ — for example, organization suggest that the cost of sales team shall be on the customer, because otherwise, the customer could not fetch the full value (the "restaurant" model), while the customer says: “I choose self-service, if at all, because otherwise the food isn’t worth the price”.
But the real question for the Go-To-Market stage is not not this, it is — how to externalise the GTM cost to the customer at the acceptable economy level. This translates into the proposition
“let’s make a customer pay all the price of our GTM — effectively, make customers acquire new customers for us — at such a level of concessions (called “waste” in my methodology) that will still sustain the growth”.
This transfers us from the growth strategy level to the Go-To-Market implications thereof. Interestingly, while PLG, SLG and CLG are growth strategies, yet, their discussion has been largely neglecting the GTM reality.
Instead, the perspective of choosing between the growth strategies is often skewed towards the self-sustainability of the organization — maintaining the proper cost-revenue balance during the phases of customer acquisition - monetization - retention. My perspective is radically different — it shall be centered on the issue of the sustainability of growth momentum during the GTM stage specifically.
Many think the customer is available in principle, the problem is how to avoid the excessive cost of negotiations and customers qualifications while preserving the pricing power.
I think the customer has to be unlocked, i.e. he or she does not available at source for the GTM enterprise: all the logic of Go-To-Market stage that ICP clients are hidden vs the visible market, they are hard to access both physically and mentally and also they are intentionally kept unlocked by sequential gatekeepers.
How do each of these strategies connect to the structural problems of the Go-To-Market stage as well as GTM moves? The following discussion references the 7 greatest perils of the GTM stage article.
PLG strategy — in theory — helps circumvent the product's value apprehension perils, including Poorly Articulated Value and/or Misaligned language.
For example, outcome-based propositions are visualized using a single metric, based on clear organizational outcomes, and further supported by case studies or client success stories, which makes them reusable and easily digestible. In fact, it is not the strategy, but execution that decides. As I discuss in the article “7 death perils of GTM” complex hybrid products, especially those requiring consulting during deployment or support, may easily fall prey to this death peril as their outcomes depend on multiple contingencies.
Misaligned language — the naming and framing of the category — might be both a value apprehension and structural problem, especially when GTM works for a totally new product. PLG, as such, does not possess an adequate arsenal to tackle this problem in the structural sense: languaging does not belong to landing pages, it is not even fixed to say “we nailed it on the website, come and read” — it is fluid.
SLG helps preserve the organization's self-sustainability in conditions of strong structural opposition, like where there are Sequential gatekeepers in the market or client business — SLG is the key to successively opening the door. SLG also may work to dissolve some of the organization’s doubts — like in the Great Doubter peril — simply by faculty of human to human negotiations. Doubts may persist but their acuteness might be temporarily healed.
Also, SLG may work in the case of market compression conditions, where there’s a peril of fast client pool depletion or hard accessibility of clients — sales teams just tend to use a wider net / more vague language that will save more clients from early disqualification. For many GTM organisations this may create an illusion that the addressable pool has not shrunk, though in reality it’s just a question of time.
CLG helps win over the Buyer Champions — a key to solving the structural problems of GTM — through making them your allies. It may be regarded as a solution to the Market Compression challenge: gentle customer engagement both saves the existing pull from burning out prematurely and expands the pool size by driving in more new customers that were “out of the radar” before.
My overall conclusion is that PLG, SLG and CLF strategies are not GTM moves in the strict sense — these are growth strategies (or playbooks of archetypal market moves) that need a proper GTM finishing — how to reduce or externalize their GTM costs.
Structural waste mechanism
PLG externalizes qualification cost onto the customer — this is its core efficiency claim and its core waste generator simultaneously. The customer self-selects, self-educates, and self-qualifies, which saves the organization sales headcount and negotiation time. But this externalization only works if the customer can successfully complete the qualification journey without assistance. When they can't — because the product is complex, because the value is not immediately legible, because the language is misaligned with their mental model — they don't ask for help. They disengage silently. PLG has no mechanism for catching silent disengagement early because its architecture is built around activity signals, not comprehension signals. A customer who is confused looks identical to a customer who is evaluating until the moment they stop logging in entirely.
This is PLG's structural waste: it produces a steady stream of engaged-but-unqualified prospects who consume onboarding resources, occupy pipeline stages, and generate activity metrics that look like progress until they suddenly don't. The waste is invisible at the individual level and only detectable in aggregate — which means by the time it's visible, significant resources have already been consumed.
The second PLG waste mechanism is pricing facade maintenance. PLG's pricing power depends on the facade staying solid — the predefined plans, the invisible concessions, the illusion of non-negotiability. Maintaining this facade in conditions where competitors are offering flexibility or where large clients are pushing for custom terms requires organizational discipline that is itself costly. Every exception made and hidden, every custom negotiation conducted outside the official pricing structure, is a crack in the facade that requires active management. This is motion waste — energy spent on concealment rather than creation.
Accumulation timeline
PLG waste is slow to accumulate and slow to become visible, which makes it particularly dangerous. In months one through three the activity metrics look healthy: signups, activations, trial conversions. In months four through six the cohort analysis starts showing divergence: a subset of early users is deeply engaged while a growing tail is dormant. This is typically attributed to ICP refinement needs rather than recognized as a comprehension waste signal. By months seven through twelve the conversion rate from trial to paid is plateauing despite increasing top-of-funnel investment — the organization is running faster to stand still. The fatal threshold arrives when the cost of top-of-funnel acquisition required to maintain conversion volume exceeds the contribution margin of the converted customers. At this point PLG has become a customer acquisition treadmill rather than a growth engine.
Misattribution trap
PLG waste is almost universally misattributed to onboarding quality. The response — redesigning the onboarding flow, adding tooltips, creating tutorial content, hiring a customer success manager to manually rescue disengaged trials — is expensive and treats a comprehension problem as a UX problem. Occasionally the onboarding fix works, which reinforces the misattribution and delays recognition of the deeper structural issue. More often it produces a temporary improvement in activation metrics without affecting conversion or retention, and the organization concludes it needs better onboarding again rather than recognizing that the product's value is not legible enough for self-qualification to work.
Survivability condition
PLG's waste pattern is survivable when three conditions hold simultaneously:
When any of these three conditions fails, PLG's waste accumulates faster than growth can compensate.
In peril terms (re: “7 death perils of GTM” article): PLG is most dangerous in the presence of Peril 3 (poorly articulated value), Peril 5 (misaligned language), and Peril 1 (small addressable market). It is relatively resilient against Peril 6 (sequential gatekeepers) and Peril 4 (Great Doubter) — precisely because it bypasses the human negotiation layer where those perils do their damage.
Structural waste mechanism
SLG concentrates GTM intelligence in the sales team — qualification knowledge, relationship capital, negotiation scripts, peril navigation experience. This concentration is SLG's strength in complex selling environments and its structural fragility simultaneously. The organization's ability to acquire customers becomes dependent on a small number of individuals who carry institutional knowledge that exists nowhere else. Every sales hire is a knowledge reconstruction project. Every departure is a knowledge destruction event.
This is SLG's first structural waste: knowledge concentration cost. It is invisible in early GTM when the founding team is doing the selling and the knowledge concentration is a feature rather than a bug — the founders know the product, the market, and the perils better than anyone. It becomes a waste when the organization tries to scale the sales function, because scaling SLG requires transferring tacit knowledge that was never made explicit. The typical response — sales playbooks, scripts, CRM discipline — captures the surface of the knowledge without the judgment layer underneath. New sales hires follow the script and produce worse results than the founders, which is attributed to hiring quality rather than recognized as a knowledge transfer failure.
SLG's second structural waste mechanism is confidence maintenance cost. SLG can temporarily dissolve the Great Doubter through human-to-human negotiation, but the doubt is suppressed, not resolved. This means the sales team must redo the confidence work at every significant touchpoint — at renewal, at upsell, at any moment when external conditions reactivate the doubt. This recurring confidence maintenance is a cost that doesn't appear in CAC but accumulates invisibly in the cost of retention and expansion. In markets where the Great Doubter is structurally present — regulatory dependency, technology uncertainty, macroeconomic sensitivity — SLG organizations are running a confidence treadmill alongside their sales treadmill.
The third SLG waste mechanism is the vague net problem: in conditions of market compression, sales teams widen their qualification criteria to maintain pipeline volume. This produces a specific waste cascade when non-ICP clients enter the pipeline and consume sales resources through longer cycles and more complex negotiations. Some convert, consuming onboarding and customer success resources. Most churn earlier than ICP clients, generating a retention waste signal that is attributed to product fit rather than qualification failure. The addressable ICP pool is simultaneously being depleted by genuine acquisitions and polluted by near-miss acquisitions that consume resources without generating sustainable revenue.
Accumulation timeline
SLG waste accumulates faster than PLG waste and is more visible — but is still systematically misattributed. In months one through four the sales team is productive and the pipeline is building. In months five through eight the sales cycle length starts extending as the team moves into harder accounts — the easy early wins are exhausted and the remaining ICP requires more touchpoints. This is typically attributed to deal complexity rather than pool depletion. By months nine through fifteen the cost per acquisition is rising, the sales team is showing burnout signals, and the renewal rate on early clients is lower than projected. The fatal threshold arrives when the sales team's capacity to open new accounts is fully consumed by the confidence maintenance work required to retain existing ones.
Misattribution trap
SLG waste is most commonly misattributed to sales team quality — the wrong hires, the wrong incentive structure as well as the wrong territory allocation. The response is sales team restructuring: new hires, new compensation models, new management. This occasionally produces a temporary improvement as fresh energy enters the system, but the structural waste mechanisms are unchanged and reassert themselves within two to three quarters. The deeper misattribution is that SLG organizations facing accumulating waste almost always conclude they need more sales capacity rather than recognizing that the motion itself is generating waste faster than capacity additions can compensate.
Survivability condition
SLG's waste pattern is survivable when the deal economics justify the knowledge concentration cost — high ACV, long contract duration, and expansion revenue potential that makes the confidence maintenance investment rational. It is also survivable when the peril profile is dominated by structural resistance perils (Peril 6 — sequential gatekeepers, Peril 4 — Great Doubter) where human negotiation is the only viable navigation tool. SLG is least survivable in small addressable markets (Peril 1) where pool depletion from vague net qualification is fatal, and in dispersed client environments (Peril 2) where the access cost of human-to-human selling consumes margin before value is delivered.
In terms of GTM forces (Re: “What VCs Actually Look for in a GTM Strategy”) SLG is the natural motion for
It is poorly matched to
Structural waste mechanism
CLG's structural waste mechanism is the intimacy trap: the customers who engage most actively with CLG structures — advisory boards, co-creation programs, conferences, onboarding partnerships — are systematically unrepresentative of the broader ICP. They are the most sophisticated, the most demanding, and the most invested in the product's success. Co-creating with them produces a product that is increasingly optimized for their specific needs at the expense of the median customer's experience. The organization gradually loses touch with the silent majority of its customer base while investing heavily in the vocal minority.
This is CLG's particular irony: a motion built around customer centricity produces a systematic blind spot about the vast majority of customers. The advisory board tells you what the top 10% of your customers need. The churn data eventually tells you what the other 90% needed — but by then the product has drifted toward the 10% and repositioning is expensive.
CLG's second waste mechanism is co-creation cost asymmetry. The customers who participate in co-creation are contributing strategic intelligence — their organizational knowledge, their problem framing, their vision of the product's potential — in exchange for a tailored proposition. This exchange is rational for both parties in principle. In practice the organization captures the intelligence and distributes the tailored proposition to all customers, which means the participating customer's competitive advantage from the co-creation erodes as the insights are generalized. When this dynamic becomes visible to co-creating customers — and it always does eventually — their willingness to continue contributing diminishes. The CLG engine requires continuous recruitment of new co-creators to replace those who have recognized the asymmetry, which is itself a compounding cost.
The third CLG waste mechanism is deferred qualification cost. CLG starts after the first customer is won — which means it inherits whatever qualification waste was generated by the PLG or SLG motion that preceded it. If the initial customer base includes non-ICP clients acquired through vague net SLG or silent disengagement PLG, the CLG motion will co-create with a distorted customer sample from the outset. The intimacy trap is worse when the customers being listened to most closely are themselves the wrong customers.
Accumulation timeline
CLG waste is the slowest to accumulate and the hardest to detect of the three motions, which makes it the most dangerous in a specific way. In months one through six CLG looks like pure value creation: customers are engaged, product improvements are flowing from real feedback, NPS is strong, and the advisory board relationships feel like genuine partnerships. In months seven through eighteen the product roadmap starts drifting toward complexity — features that the advisory board requested but that the median customer finds confusing or irrelevant. Onboarding time increases. Support costs rise. The organization attributes this to product maturity challenges rather than ICP drift. By months nineteen through thirty the churn signal arrives — not from the advisory board customers who are deeply embedded, but from the median customers who have been quietly accumulating unresolved friction. By this point the product has been co-created away from them and the repositioning cost is substantial.
Misattribution trap
CLG waste is almost always misattributed to product quality or market education gaps. When median customers churn, the organization's first response is to look at the product — what features are missing, what bugs are unresolved, what UX friction exists. The advisory board is consulted. The advisory board, being sophisticated co-creators, identifies further complexity to add. The product drifts further from the median customer. The second response is market education — content, webinars, onboarding improvements — on the assumption that customers are churning because they don't understand the product well enough. Both responses accelerate the drift rather than correcting it.
Survivability condition
CLG's waste pattern is survivable when the ICP is genuinely narrow and homogeneous enough that the vocal minority and the silent majority have substantially similar needs. It is also survivable when the product's expansion revenue potential is high enough that depth of relationship with a smaller number of customers generates more value than breadth of acquisition — enterprise software, professional services platforms, and infrastructure products tend to meet this condition.
CLG is least survivable when the addressable market requires scale rather than depth, and when the initial customer base was acquired through a motion that produced significant non-ICP contamination.
In peril terms: CLG is the natural solution to Peril 7 (absence of buyer champions) and the most effective mitigation for Peril 1 (small addressable market) when the strategy is to deepen value with existing customers rather than expand the pool.
It is poorly matched to markets where Peril 2 (client accessibility) is the dominant challenge — CLG requires proximity and engagement that dispersed client bases cannot sustain.
The question is not which motion produces the least waste. All three produce waste structurally and inevitably. The question is which motion's waste pattern your GTM situation can most afford to absorb — given your runway, your peril profile, your GTM force type, and your addressable market characteristics.
A simple decision logic emerges from the waste pattern analysis:
The 18 months referenced in the article's title is not arbitrary. It is approximately the time it takes for each motion's waste pattern to move from invisible accumulation to visible crisis — and therefore the window within which a GTM organization must either recognize and manage its motion's waste or switch motions before the accumulated waste from the first choice contaminates the second. Switching motions is expensive. Switching motions while carrying the waste of the previous motion is often fatal. The goal of this framework is to choose correctly once — not to optimize the switch.